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Abstract 
Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for govern-
mental and non-governmental agencies to use in addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem services. A defining 
characteristic of performance payments, a sub-category of PES schemes, is the linking of individual payments to environ-
mental outputs themselves rather than to the inputs that affect the production of environmental services. Such a focus 
raises several practical issues during implementation. We review and translate key aspects of the economic theory of incen-
tives into the context of performance payments schemes with special attention paid to two practical issues. The first is that 
of structuring individual incentives to account for risks outside the individual’s control such as weather that can affect the 
level of environmental services generated. The second deals with the possibility of distortion in the measurements of envi-
ronmental services used to determine individual payments under PES schemes. Each challenge is accompanied by a discus-
sion of advice based upon economic theory and a discussion of examples from different countries where such implementa-
tion issues arise. 
 
JEL classification:  Q20 




Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have 
become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for 
governmental and non-governmental agencies to use in 
addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem serv-
ices (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005; Wunder et al., 2008). Following Wun-
der (2005) we define a PES plan as a scheme that involves 
a voluntary transaction for a well-defined environmental 
service that is being purchased by one or more buyers 
from one or more suppliers, where the transfer of pay-
ment from buyer to seller is contingent upon provision of 
the service by the supplier. 
 
Performance payments for environmental services are a 
sub-category of the larger group of PES. A key characteris-
tic which differentiates them from other PES schemes is 
their focus on outputs rather than inputs. Most other PES 
approaches tie individual incentives to activities and prac-Introduction 
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tices that are inputs into the processes that generate envi-
ronmental services. In contrast, performance payment 
approaches tie individual incentives to the level of envi-
ronmental services actually created. In other words, per-
formance payments are the most direct payment ap-
proach (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). To use an analogy from 
the business world, the performance payment strategy 
looks more like paying a salesperson a commission for 
completed sales while an input-based approach to service 
provision would be equivalent to paying an hourly wage for 
time spent interacting with potential buyers. 
 
Such an output focus is seen as a tremendous advantage 
of performance payment schemes, because it allows the 
suppliers of environmental services to find the best way of 
combining inputs in their particular location to meet the 
overarching goals of generating a desired level of envi-
ronmental services. Such localized knowledge may not be 
available to those designing input-focused approaches 
and may frustrate attempts to efficiently generate the 
desired level of services. Indeed, previous discussions of 
performance payment approaches often highlight that 
output-based incentives provide flexibility and room for 
innovation in service provision (Musters et al., 2001), which 
allows a greater cost-effectiveness or ‘bang for the buck’ in 
delivering services (Casey and Boody, 2007; Ferraro and 
Simpson, 2002; Wätzold and Drechsler, 2005; Wunder, 
2005).  
 
Although there are many calls for an increased application 
of the performance payment approach (Albers and Fer-
raro, 2006; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Nyhus et al., 2005; 
Zechmeister et al., 2003), this payment system is not a 
panacea and it is important to be aware of its drawbacks. 
In particular, the question arises how to address potential 
risk and noise in the production process of the environ-
mental good to prevent sub-optimal incentive design. 
Furthermore, the dollars paid to scheme participants are 
tied to observable and often distorted indicators of envi-
ronmental services rather than to perfect, undistorted 
measures. An important question is thus how the incen-
tives provided through the scheme can be adjusted to the 
degree of distortion in the indicators to avoid making pay-
ments without receiving the desired environmental good.  
 
In this paper, we address these two major practical issues 
that arise when implementing performance payment 
schemes and present possible solution strategies. All pro-
posed policy approaches are followed up by tables listing 
various examples of existing performance payment 
schemes. The presentation of case studies is an effort to 
increase awareness of existing schemes that, due to their 
small or medium size, so far mostly have only been pre-
sented in the grey literature. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews the literature on incentives for PES 
schemes. Section 3 presents the basic framework of per-
formance payment schemes and discusses issues of risk 
and distortion. Section 4 examines four alternative policy 
options to accommodate for risk and distortion and closes 
with considerations on when performance payments may 
not be the first-best policy choice. Section 5 discusses the 
main findings. 
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2 Previous  work 
Shifting from input-oriented to individualized, output-
focused approaches requires a shift in mindset during 
policy design. While environmental economists have cus-
tomized established theories of public economics to for-
mulate effective guidelines for implementing command-
and-control regulations and taxes to deal with environ-
mental externalities (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1988), efforts 
to critically translate economic theories of incentives for 
use in developing effective PES schemes are more limited.  
 
Goldsmith and Basak (2001) discuss problems of risk and 
distortion in connection to making incentive payments to 
agents in a firm based on environmental performance 
indicators. Since compliance with environmental standards 
is mandatory for firms, the solutions proposed by the 
authors focus particularly on risk sharing strategies be-
tween the firm’s principal and its agent. Risk, i.e. environ-
mental noise, in contracts for general PES is examined by 
Rojahn and Engel (2005). They use a model by Holmström 
and Milgrom (1990) as a framework to investigate the 
effects of alternative environmental service production 
functions as well as cooperation among agents on optimal 
contract design. In a recent paper Ferraro (2008) discusses 
the difficulties of maximizing the additionality (i.e. the 
production of environmental services that would not have 
been supplied without payments) of a budget-limited PES 
scheme under conditions of asymmetric information. 
Three policy options to cope with asymmetric information 
are presented and evaluated: procurement auctions, 
screening contracts, and the acquisition of information 
about agents’ opportunity costs.  
 
Apart from these contributions, the current PES literature 
still lacks a more in-depth discussion of the advantages, 
disadvantages as well as applicability of different incentive 
payment approaches for direct payment schemes.  
 
In the principal-agent and labor economics literature many 
models have been developed that account for risk and 
uncertainty in the derivation of optimal incentive contracts 
(e.g. Holmström and Milgrom 1987, 1991; Mirrlees 1975). 
The trade-off of risk and incentives deduced from these 
models has more recently been questioned by Prender-
gast (2000, 2002) who suggests that there may be a posi-
tive relationship between uncertainty and incentives. 
 
Considerable attention has also been paid to analyzing the 
effects of distortion in incentive contracts (e.g. Kerr 1975; 
Baiman and Noel, 1985; Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993; 
Feltham and Xie, 1994; Datar et al., 2001; Baker 2002).  
 
This paper contributes by translating key findings from the 
established literature to the specific PES context. Strate-
gies to cope with risk and distortion in incentive design are 
pinpointed and backed-up by examples from the field.  
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3 Framework 
Models have been established that examine the optimal 
provision of incentives (Laffont and Martimort, 2002) when 
the two parties involved have conflicting goals, e.g. the 
environmental service buyer wants a greater level of serv-
ice provision and the service supplier wants to exert less 
costly effort to meet the demands of the buyer. Buyers of 
environmental services typically are governments, NGOs, 
or private companies (Engel et al., 2008). They can, in their 
role as buying agency, define the details of the environ-
mental good or service that is to be purchased through the 
performance payment contract. This can be virtually any 
good or service, e.g. increase of biodiversity in agricultural 
landscapes, conservation of certain endangered species, 
reduction of groundwater nitrification, etc. The more spe-
cific and quantifiable the goal is, the easier it will be to 
design the appropriate incentives. 
 
In general, the paying agency is assumed to be risk neutral 
and will be indifferent between two options with the same 
e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f .  R i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  i s  p l a u s i b l e  i n  c a s e  t h e  
paying agency has a diversified investment strategy rather 
than a single focus on one contract. Suppliers of environ-
mental services, in contrast to buyers, are assumed to be 
risk averse. Furthermore, we cannot assume that suppliers 
in general are altruistic. This means that without additional 
incentives they will only produce as much of the environ-
mental service as is necessary to optimize their own wel-
fare. Society’s benefit of the goods produced is not of 
importance for their initial private production decision.  
 
The success or failure of an initiative for a performance 
payment scheme may also depend on the prevailing insti-
tutional framework conditions. Both buyers and sellers will 
want to be certain that the terms of the contract are verifi-
able by a third party in case of a dispute. Equivalently, 
enforceablity of the contract through the legal system is an 
important precondition (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Both par-
ties may be reluctant to sign a contract if essential frame-
work conditions are lacking. This may hamper efforts to 
install performance payment schemes in countries with 
deficient legal systems.  
 
3.1  Basic structure of performance 
payment approach 
Typically models of performance-based payment schemes 
presented in labor economics consist of two parts: a base 
payment and a variable incentive payment. The base pay-
ment can be set so that the participant’s expected utility of 
scheme participation always at least equals his reservation 
utility (Datar et al., 2001). In the PES context, this means 
that it must be equal to the participant’s opportunity cost 
of producing the environmental good. Providing such a 
base payment is an option, in particular if risk is to be 
shared between the paying agency and the participant. 
Providing a monetary base payment weakens the condi-
tionality concept which is at the core of performance pay-
ment schemes. To strengthen conditionality, the paying 
agency may choose to work wi t h variable incenti ve pay-
ments and only provide a non-monetary base payment, 
e.g. training opportunities or certificates for participation. 
This type of in-kind base payment could be altered by 
program administrators in concert with the strength of the 
optimal variable payment. Monetary payments to cover 
initial investment costs can be issued on a separate basis.  
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The variable payment serves as a contingent bonus which 
depends on the environmental outcome. The environ-
mental outcome can be measured by one or several per-
formance indicators. The major challenge for the paying 
agency is to determine the optimal variable payment that 
will induce scheme participants to maximize the environ-
mental outcome. In Figure 1, the dotted line indicates the 
incentive payment. In terms of the figure, finding the opti-
mal incentive power means determining the optimal slope 
for the dotted line. 
 
 
Figure 1: Outline of a performance payment scheme 
 
3.2  Risk and distortion 
Designing optimal contracts is fairly simple under condi-
tions of certainty. However, the production of many envi-
ronmental goods is both a function of human activities and 
environmental factors that often occur at random and may 
be very difficult to control. 
 
In the majority of cases the exact production function may 
not even be known. Some production processes may in-
volve great investments which entail path dependencies 
for the land owner, e.g. the plantation of hedges to reduce 
soil erosion or afforestation to stabilize groundwater flows 
(Rojahn and Engel, 2005). These measures can be very 
costly but there is no guarantee that they will truly foster 
the environmental outcome that is being paid for. Addi-
tionally, numerous external shocks can give rise to uncer-
tainty, e.g. changes in the natural environment, market 
price fluctuations, or political upheavals. 
 
Apart from production risks, distortion in the performance 
indicator is an important issue. Labor economists and 
accounting scholars regularly study problems of tying in-
centives to distorted indicators, e.g. Kerr’s (1975) classical 
article “On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B” 
(see also Baiman and Noel, 1985; Datar et al., 2001; 
Feltham and Xie, 1994). Distortion in our context means 
that a scheme participant can conduct certain activities 
that will increase the good measured by the performance 
indicator without simultaneously adding to the attainment 
of the environmental goal.  
 
As a key feature, the production process of the good is not 
prescribed in a performance payment scheme. Naturally, 
there will often be several ways to produce the good 
measured by the performance indicator, but not all may 
necessarily increase the environmental goal. If the dis-
torted production processes are more cost efficient, the 
scheme participants will opt for these. An article published 
in the New York Times in 1898 provides anecdotal evidence 
of such a case in poin t : “The bounty gi ven by the I ndian 
Government for snakes’ heads in order to exterminate 
these reptiles, has led to a few of the dishonest natives 
breeding them for a living” (The New York Times, 
23.01.1898). 
 
Distortion can also arise due to a badly chosen perform-
ance indicator which for all possible production processes 
simply has no, or very low, correlation with the environ-
mental goal. Tying payments to inputs which are only 
loosely correlated with the desired outputs can be inter-
preted as a special case of distorted performance indica-
tors (Baker, 2002). This applies to many input-based PES 
approaches.  
 
Whether a performance payment scheme is an expedient 
solution to attain the overall goal will to a large extent 
depend on the degree of congruence between the goal 
and the performance measure. Utilizing distorted meas-
ures provides dim prospects for goal attainment.  
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4  Alternative incentive design options 
Assume a paying agency would like to obtain more of an 
environmental good, E , e.g., clutches of a rare bird in a 
field. For simplicity, the agent, in this case the owner of the 
field, can only pursue two actions which will help reach the 
paying agency’s goal:  1 a , reduction of chemical use and, 
2 a , planting of special fruit trees. A third action, 
3 a , has no 
impact on the production of the environmental good. The 
production function for the environmental good is as-
sumed to be  
()   + + + = 3 3 2 2 1 1 , f a f a f a a E  (1) 
where 
3 2 1 , , f f f  are the marginal impacts of the actions on 
the goal with  0 , 2 1  f f  and  0 3 = f . Certain external 
environmental effects,   (with variance  2
   and mean 0 ), 
also impact the number of bird clutches on the field.  
 
The field owner’s expense is assumed to be certain and to 









a a a a D + + = .  
The paying agency rewards the field owner through a 
linear payment scheme 
E c b e +  (2) 
which, as discussed above, consists of the base payment, 
b , and the variable incentive payment,  E ce .  
 
As in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), for a risk averse 
agent with a coefficient of absolute risk aversion,  , utility 
can be modeled in a standard way by a negative exponen-
tial utility function  
() () i e a D E c b e
 +  
 .  
The scheme participant’s expected utility can be expressed 
as a function,  , of utility 
() () ()
i e a D E c b e
 +  
   
The paying agency’s task is now to determine the optimal 
incentive payments.  
 
The payment scheme in the model, as well as in Figure 1, is 
linear. Although the linearity assumption is tied to the 
restrictive assumptions of normally distributed environ-
mental noise terms and a constant absolute risk aversion 
utility function for the scheme participant (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005), it is chosen due to its convenience and 
simplicity. 
 
4.1  Single performance indicator 
Building on the basic model presented above, in this first 
scenario it is assumed that the paying agency would like to 
make use of only one performance indicator. Either the 
agency has an overall environmental goal that can easily 
be quantified and directly used as performance measure or 
it must make use of a distorted proxy indicator. In both 
cases, the performance measures may not accurately re-
flect the participant’s efforts in the production process. 
This is due to the random environmental events that also 
impact the performance measure. The scheme participant 
consequently perceives the performance measure as risky. 
The paying agency is advised to take this into account 
when designing the scheme.  
 
The optimal weight for an undistorted performance meas-
ure, in our example bird clutches in the field, is found by 
maximizing the expected net benefit to the paying agency 
subject to the constraint that the participant chooses 
activities that maximize his utility and the constraint that 
the total payment to the agent must be higher than his 
reservation utility. The expected net benefit to the paying 
agency is computed as the difference between the con-
stant per unit value of the environmental good minus the 
payment to the scheme participant. For simplicity the 
derivations are omitted here but they can e.g. be found in 
detail in Holmström and Milgrom (1991) or Bolton and 
Dewatripont (2005, pp. 137-139). Zabel & Roe – Performance payments for environmental services 
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= e c  
This condition tells the paying agency that the optimal 
incentive payment should decrease with (i) an increase in 
the participant’s risk aversion, and (ii) an increase in the 
variance of the environmental noise.  
 
Eventually, the paying agency will not have the opportu-
nity to employ an undistorted performance measure but 
rather will have to settle for a distorted proxy, G . In our 
example, the agency may not want to search the field for 
clutches to avoid disturbing the birds. As an alternative it 
may choose to assess the number of rare birds by acousti-
cally measuring the intensity of their songs. If the birds’ 
chirps are difficult to distinguish between species, this 
performance measure runs the risk of becoming distorted. 
The field owner has the possibility to attract many differ-
ent bird species to his field by laying out birdfeed. Obvi-
ously this action is significantly cheaper than planting 
special fruit trees or reducing chemical usage and it will 
increase the intensity of bird chirps. 
 
More formally, this distorted performance measure’s sen-
sitivity to the agent’s actions is indicated by the respective 
marginal impacts, 
i g . The new production function is 
()   + + + = 3 3 2 2 1 1 , g a g a g a a G , where   are the external 
environmental effects with variance  2
   and mean 0 . 
Note that the third action, 
3 a , which did not have an im-
pact on the production of the environmental good now 
has an impact, 
   g3  0 on the performance measure G . 
The paying agency will now want to determine the opti-
mal incentive payment, 
g c  for the linear payment scheme 
G c b g +  (3) 
It is particularly important to understand that agents will 
adjust their actions to optimize their payoff based on the 
given performance indicator. The scheme’s overall goal 
statement does not necessarily influence their actions. 
Participants may appreciate and approve of the overall 
goal but the performance measure is the decisive incentive 
that steers the individuals’ actions.  
 
Contract theory literature suggests several similar ap-
proaches to measure distortion. Feltham and Xie (1994) 
square the difference between the relative impact of two 
actions on an undistorted and a distorted performance 
measure. Provided there is no distortion the relative im-
pacts of the two measures will be equal and the term is 
zero. Datar et al. (2001) assess distortion as the squared 
difference between the actions’ marginal impacts on out-
come and the sensitivity of the distorted performance 
measure to these actions. Instead of directly calculating 
the difference between marginal impacts, Baker (2002) 
measures the cosine between the two vectors indicating 
the sensitivity of the performance measures to the agent’s 
actions. No distortion means that the angle between the 
vectors is zero and thus the cosine equals one. Making use 















i f  and 
i g  are vectors of the actions’ marginal im-
pacts and 
i f  and
i g  represent the respective norms.   
is the angle between the vectors which measures distor-
tion.  
 
The analysis of the optimal weight for a distorted per-
formance measure,
g c , (in the absence of alternatives) 
renders rather intuitive results. It should decrease as dis-
tortion increases, decrease as environmental noise in the 
production process increases, as well as decrease as risk 
aversion increases (Baker, 2002). 
 
The models presented above identify optimality conditions 
for the design of scheme incentives. The comparative 
statics showed how the incentives should be adjusted in 
reaction to a marginal change in one of the parameters. In 
reality, a scheme designer is however unlikely to have full 
information on all the parameters that are necessary to 
compute optimal incentives. Oftentimes the incentives 
may rather be established in an iterative trail-and-error 
approach. The examples listed in the table below are thus 
of less analytical nature but showcase how schemes have 
been designed and, in particular, which type of indicators 
have been chosen.  
 Alternative incentive design options 
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Table 1 below provides an overview of fourteen perform-
ance payment schemes from around the world that each 
makes use of a single performance indicator. The first 
column indicates the geographical location of the scheme. 
The second column lists the environmental good that is to 
be produced. In terms of the models presented above, this 
refers to the environmental good,  E , in equation 1. The 
incentive payments,  E ce  (Eq. 2), respectively  G cg  (Eq. 3) 
of each particular scheme are given in column three. It is 
interesting to note that none of the schemes listed in Ta-
ble 1 offer a monetary base payment. This indicates that 
the scheme designers opted for strong conditionality of 
the payments. 
Table 1: Schemes with a single performance indicator 
Program location (Source)  Goal(s) to be achieved  Incentives 
1  Germany  
(Pürckhauer, 2007) 
Conservation of Montagu’s harrier (Circus 
pygargus) 
Payment per aerie, calculated to compensate crop 
loss from setting aside 50x50 m area around aerie 
2  Germany  
(Roßkamp, 2007) 
Conservation of certain bird species [black-
tailed godwit (Limosa limosa), peewit (Vanel-
lus vanellus), redshank (Tringa totanus), and 
pied oystercatcher (Haematopus longirostris)] 
Payment per protected clutch
1 
3  Nebraska, USA  
(NGPC, 2005) 
Conservation of mountain plovers (Charadrius 
montanus) 
Payment of $100 per nest to farmers (farmers 
required to assist in locating and flagging of nests 
prior to weed control tillage) 
4  Argentina (IUCN-SSC 
Crocodile Specialist 
Group, 2004) 
Caiman (Caiman latirostris, Caiman yacare) 
conservation and ranching 
Payments (US$7) for each nest located and 
marked by locals 
5  Sweden (Zabel & Holm-
Müller, 2008) 
Increase of wolverine (Gulo gulo) population  Payments (approx. US$ 33,450) per carnivore 
offspring 
6  Sweden (Zabel & Holm-
Müller, 2008) 
Increase of lynx (Lynx lynx) population  Payments (approx. US$ 33,450) per carnivore 
offspring 
7  Kenya  
(Ferraro, 2007) 
Release of turtles caught in fishing nets  Payments (approx. US$7) for the release of adult 
and sub-adult turtles and (approx. US$4) for 
smaller turtles 
8  Esperanza (Rojas & 
Aylward, 2002) 
1. forest protection in watershed 
2. avoidance of potential land invasions  
3. Managing of forest and forest guards 
4. Economic viability for conservation 
Payment (US$10) per ha and year multiplied by 
relationship of real to projected energy produc-
tion in water powerplant and an inflation correc-
tion term 
9  Seychelles (Ministry of 
Environment Seychelles, 
2008) 
Eradication of alien Indian House Crow (Cor-
vus splendens) Program was successful; com-
plete eradication achieved 
Payment (approx. US$100) per killed crow 
10  Montana, USA (Pokorny 
& Krueger-Mangold, 
2007) 
Eradication of dyer’s woad (Isatis tinctoria) 
from Montana 
Payment (US$50) for notification of new infesta-
tion located at least 1km from known site 
11  Oregon, USA  
(Porter, 2008) 
Control of 7 specified noxious weeds  Payment of $200 for the reporting of a new 
infestation site within a designated area 
12  Louisiana, USA (Louisi-
ana Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries, 
2007) 
Protection of coastal ecosystem through 
harvest of up to 400,000 nutria (Myocaster 
coypus) annually 
Payment (US$5) per nutria tail 
13  India (The New York 
Times, 1898) 
Decrease of snake population  Payment per snake head 
14  Samoa (Shine et al., 
2000) 
Control of alien African Snails  “a few cents per snail killed” 
1  Funding of the program is provided by a local beer brewery. For each crate of beer sold during 7 designated weeks the brewery invests 
approx. US$0.3 into environmental protection projects. Zabel & Roe – Performance payments for environmental services 
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The level of distortion varies across the indicators chosen 
in the different schemes. The first six schemes focus on 
the conservation of certain wildlife species. Their perform-
ance indicators measure wildlife population increases, e.g. 
bird and caiman nests or carnivore offspring. One of the 
schemes listed in Table 1 is situated in Kenya and issues 
payments to fishermen for each turtle released from a 
fishing net. Theoretically, this scheme provides incentives 
to intentionally fish for turtles, though no such distortionary 
activities have been reported (Ferraro, 2007). The last six 
case studies in Table 1 are all examples of bounty schemes 
to eradicate or control invasive species. The Seychelle’s 
bounty program is stated to have been very successful and 
resulted in a complete eradication of the invasive Indian 
House Crow (Corvus splendens) (Ministry of Environment 
Seychelles, 2008). Performance payment schemes that 
make use of bounties are however prone to give rise to 
distortion. Explicit breeding of invasive species as a result 
of a bounty scheme was discovered in India (case 13) many 
years ago and more recently in Samoa (case 14) (Shine et 
al., 2000; The New York Times, 1898). Explicit monitoring 
systems, such as control visits or requirements to map the 
trapping sites (Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fish-
eries, 2007) may help prevent such perverse incentives. 
 
4.2  Several performance measures  
Eventually the paying agency may not want to rely on only 
one performance measure. For example, goods such as 
biodiversity conservation are likely to call for a plurality of 
indicators (Duelli and Obrist, 2003). A set of several meas-
ures in combination may be convenient. In a noiseless 
environment, the performance indicators would be direct 
functions of the agent’s actions. The optimal weights for 
alternative indicators could be determined by regressing, 
without intercept, the marginal impacts of the undistorted 
measure on the marginal impacts of the distorted meas-
ures (Datar et al., 2001). The resulting regression coeffi-
cients would provide the optimal weights. 
 
However, in reality it is unlikely to come across completely 
noiseless performance measures. A comparison of suit-
able indicators will most likely reveal a tradeoff between 
risk and distortion. Assume for simplicity that two indica-
tors are to be used: one undistorted but with substantial 
noise and one distorted but less risky. Referring to our 
previous notation this implies that  2 2
    < . A question of  
interest is how the distorted performance measure should 
be weighted relative to the undistorted measure. Baker 
(2002) does analysis on these relative weights and finds 
that an increase in distortion leads to a decrease in the 
relative weight of the distorted performance measure. As 
noise in the undistorted performance measure increases, 
the relative weight of the distorted performance measure 
increases. The effect of an increase in noise of the dis-
torted performance measure is ambiguous. 
 
While Baker (2002) focuses on changes in the noise of the 
production functions, Datar et al. (2001) analyze changes 
in the marginal impacts of actions. In their sense, an undis-
torted measure is a function of some number of actions 
and the distorted measure is a function of merely a subset 
of these actions. The incongruent measure, in this model, 
is not sensitive to any additional actions. Again referring to 
our previous notation, the undistorted performance meas-
ure is  ()   + + = 2 2 1 1 , f a f a a E  with  0 , 2 1  f f  whereas 
the distorted measure now can be noted as 
()   + = 1 1 , g a a G  with  0 1  g . 
 
Assume the first action’s impact on the undistorted meas-
ure increases, 1 f  , for some exogenous reason. Datar et al. 
(2001) find that the optimal reaction to this change de-
pends on the size of the first action’s impact on the envi-
ronmental goal relative to the second action’s impact. 
Provided the first action’s new marginal impact remains 
much smaller than that of the second action, it is optimal 
to directly target an increase in the first action by means of 
increasing the weight on the distorted measure, G . An 
increase in the performance payment based on the envi-
ronmental good,  E , would induce the agent to increase 
the second action more than the first, since the second 
action’s marginal impact is relatively larger. This increased 
engagement in the second action, would provoke the 
agent to request an increased risk premium. The paying 
agency can avoid this cost by directly targeting the first 
action.  
 
In case the new marginal impact of the first action is much 
larger than that of the second it is optimal to increase the 
weight of the undistorted performance measure. This will 
directly lead to the desired increase of the first action. 
Table 2 summarizes the effects of changes in the parame-
ters (first column) on the optimal incentive payments (top 
row).  Alternative incentive design options 
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Table 2: Effects of selected parameters on optimal incentive power 
  Incentive payment for 
undistorted indicator, 




g c  
Incentive payment for undistorted 
indicator relative to payment for 
distorted indicator, 
g e c c  
Variance of noise in production function 
of undistorted indicator ,
2
         
Variance of noise in production function 
of distorted indicator , 2
         
Scheme participant’s coefficient of  
absolute risk aversion,         
Distortion,  
 cos        
Marginal impact of action 1 on  
undistorted indicator,  1 f     
, for 
2 1 1 f f f <<  +  
, for 
2 1 1 f f f >>  +  
 
Examples of performance payment schemes that employ 
several indicators simultaneously are listed in Table 3. The 
construction of this table is identical to that of Table 1. The 
first column states the program location, followed by a 
description of the environmental goal and the incentive 
payments in columns two and three respectively. The first 
case in Table 3, a turtle nest protection project of the Ki-
unga Marine National Reserve, Kenya, is an example of a 
scheme that follows the indications of the economic the-
ory. This project is run by WWF and the Kenya Wildlife 
Service and is especially targeted at women (Ferraro, 
2007). The goal is to conserve marine turtles. A perform-
ance payment of 500 Kenyan Shillings (approx. US$7.5) is 
paid to local women for each certified turtle nest discov-
ered on the beach. An additional payment of 20 Shillings 
(approx. US$0.04) is paid for each successfully hatched 
turtle egg and 10 Shillings (approx. US$0.02) for an unsuc-
cessful hatchment (Flintan, 2002). An average nest counts 
about 115 eggs. These payments provide incentives to not 
only look for turtle nests but also to monitor and protect 
them from predators. The analogy to the theory of incen-
tives is straightforward. The more distorted but less risky 
performance measure is the discovery of a turtle egg nest. 
The less distorted but more risky performance measure is 
the actual hatchment of a baby turtle. The actual hatch-
ment of a turtle naturally happens after the eggs were laid 
in the nest. Consequently, all the risk factors that played a 
role up to the point when the adult turtle lays the eggs are 
also included in the risk connected to the hatchment. 
However there are additional risk factors that may cause 
embryo mortality such as predation or problems with gas 
exchange in the nest (Ackerman, 1980). Thus, due to these 
supplementary risks, the hatchment of a baby turtle can be 
counted as more risky than the creation of a turtle egg 
nest by an adult turtle. 
 
Assume the noise in the undistorted performance meas-
ure ‘turtle hatchments’ were to increase for some given 
exogenous reason. In this case, the policy recommenda-
tion derived from theory would be to shift relatively more 
weight on the distorted measure discovery of nests. 
 
A further example in Table 3 is the silvopastoral ecosystem 
management project in Nicaragua (case 3). In this scheme 
a battery of different land uses are indexed according to 
their carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation 
characteristics (Pagiola et al., 2007). From this data a spe-
cial environmental services index is computed. Land own-
ers receive payments based on net increases of their envi-
ronmental services index relative to their base index at the 
time of contracting. The Nicaraguan scheme is also a rare 
example of a scheme that made an upfront payment. It 
was issued based on the environmental services index at 
the time of contracting to prevent land owners from cut-
ting all their trees prior to the program’s initiation (Pagiola 
et al., 2007).  Zabel & Roe – Performance payments for environmental services 
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Table 3: Schemes with more than one performance indicator 
Program location (Source)  Goal(s) to be achieved  Incentives 
1  Kenya (Flintan, 2002; 
Ferraro, 2007) 
Turtle conservation  Payment (approx. US$7.5) per reported turtle nest 
and payment (approx. US$0.04) for each success-
ful hatching and (approx. US$0.02) for each un-
successful (rotten) egg 
2  Tanzania  
(Ferraro, 2007) 
Turtle conservation/ Reduction of poaching by 
locals 
Payment (approx. US$2.5) per reported turtle nest  
and payment (approx. US$0.03) for each success-
ful hatching and (approx. US$0.02) for each un-
successful (rotten) egg 
3  Nicaragua  
(Pagiola et al., 2007) 
Adoption of silvopastoral practices  Payment (US$75) per annual point increase in 
program’s environmental services index 
4  Germany  
(Stapelholmer Natur-
schutzvereine, 2007) 
Conservation of four endangered bird species 
[black-tailed godwit (Limosa limosa), peewit 
(Vanellus vanellus), redshank (Tringa totanus), 
and curlew (Numenius arquata)] 
Payments per hectare and differentiated accord-
ing to single breeding birds and entire colonies 
Certain management rules while birds present  
5  Iowa, USA  
(Morton et al., 2006) 
Water quality improvement  P-index,  
Soil Conditioning Index (SCI),  
and cornstalk nitrate test  
 
4.3  Relative performance evaluation 
Wätzold and Schwertner (2005) argue that a major disad-
vantage of performance payments in agri-environmental 
schemes is that an individual’s performance also depends 
on external environmental effects such as weather influ-
ences. In cases when external noise seems unacceptably 
high, relative performance evaluation (RPE) may be a solu-
tion. An essential precondition for this approach is that 
several participants face production noise that is corre-
lated (e.g., σ = σs + σi where σs is the systematic portion of 
risk faced by all participants and σi is the idiosyncratic 
portion that represent separate individual draws from a 
common distribution of production noise). The greater the 
systematic portion of the production risk, the more effec-
tive are RPE approaches. RPE here means linking individual 
compensation to the individual’s performance relative to 
other participants’ performance. Both continuous schemes 
and discrete schemes (e.g., a rank-order tournament where 
discrete prizes are awarded for performance levels that are 
the highest, second-highest, etc.) can be used.  
 
It is important that an individual cannot influence the 
value of the benchmark. Otherwise RPE may provide incen-
tives for agents to influence the benchmark by sabotaging 
other’s work (Lazear, 1989). Similarly, incentives for collu-
sive shirking, i.e. making agreements within the reference 
group on low performance, may arise. Also, some potential 
scheme participants may be muscled out by others in an 
attempt to influence the composition of the reference 
group (i.e., group composition risk). For example, there may 
be an effort to remove potential curve-wreckers. Finally, 
production externalities can complicate the creation of an 
exogenous benchmark (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990).  
 
Often agents in an RPE scheme are assumed to be homo-
geneous. Relaxing this assumption, i.e. allowing for het-
erogeneous agents in terms of marginal investment costs 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981) or variance in agents’ abilities 
(Tsoulouhas and Marinakis, 2007) can, to a certain extent, 
compromise the benefits of RPE. Tsoulouhas and Marinakis 
(2007) show how the variability of individual’s output 
increases along with heterogeneity which in turn is found 
t o  r e d u c e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  R P E  o v e r  d i r e c t  p e r f o r m a n c e  
payments. However, very large numbers of scheme par-
ticipants can cancel out the drawbacks of heterogeneity. 
 
Examples for the use of RPE in agri-environmental 
schemes are nitrate leaching reduction programs around 
watersheds. In Germany, there are many schemes de-
signed by water utility companies that offer payments to 
farmers who reduce the amount of nitrogen runoff from 
their fields (Mangelsdorf and Attenberger, 1999). Annually 
a soil sample is collected from each participant’s field Alternative incentive design options 
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during a certain time period, typically in fall after the post-
harvest fertilization. The amount of nitrogen in each sam-
ple is then determined. Weather influences, such as tem-
perature and rain fall, have a great impact on nitrogen 
evaporation as well as run-off. In other words, weather 
conditions have significant influence on the amount of 
nitrogen that remains in the soil after fertilization. Hence, 
the amount of nitrogen in a soil sample from the same 
field may vary greatly from year to year even if all other 
factors were held constant. To back out the weather 
‘noise’, the performance measure is defined as the amount 
of nitrogen found in each participant’s soil sample relative 
to the average of all other scheme participants (Man-
gelsdorf and Attenberger, 1999).  
 
4.4 Performance  thresholds 
Rather than measuring performance on a continuous scale 
or comparing it to that of others, some agri-environmental 
schemes make use of performance thresholds. The partici-
pant thus receives a payment once his environmental 
service production is equal to, or larger than, a given 
threshold. How this threshold is set can be of importance 
for scheme success. With an externally given static thresh-
old, scheme participants will have incentives to produce 
just enough of the environmental good to receive the 
bonus. There will be no incentives to produce more of the 
good than to meet the threshold level. 
 
Alternatively, the threshold can be flexible over time and 
adjusted to past performance. For example, the current 
year’s threshold may be defined as either the past year’s 
threshold or the past year’s true performance level, which-
ever was larger. This mode of setting a threshold is called 
the ratchet effect (Weitzman, 1980; Murphy, 2001). Ratch-
eting the threshold level may give rise to incentives for the 
scheme participant to smooth her performance between 
years to prevent a large increase in the threshold (Murphy, 
2001). Assume for example a biodiversity scheme that 
defines its ratcheted performance threshold as a certain 
number of selected plant species on a given field. In a year 
with plant abundance beyond the threshold level, a farmer 
may have incentives to intentionally reduce the plant 
species prior to monitoring to avoid an increase in the 
threshold for the coming period. 
 
An example of a scheme with an externally given thresh-
o l d  i s  t h e  G e r m a n  M E K A I I  s c h e m e  i n  B a d e n - W u e r t t e m -
berg. Farmers receive a base payment conditional on cer-
tain action-oriented criteria. Additional to the base pay-
ment they can apply for a performance payment if they 
meet the threshold of hosting at least four out of a given 
list of 28 special plant species on their fields (Oppermann, 
2003). Providing 5 or even all 28 of the specified plant spe-
cies will however not increase the payment. The payment 
is thus capped from above.  
 
A similar scheme is currently being planned in Lower Sax-
ony, Germany. The explicit goal of this scheme is to sup-
port grasslands that are valuable with respect to diversity 
in plant genetics (Niedersächsisches Umweltministerium, 
2 0 0 7 ) .  A s  i n  t h e  M E K A I I  s c h e m e ,  t h e  f o c u s  h e r e  i s  o n  
whether selected plant species grow on the field. The first 
threshold is set at four out of a list of specified plants. If a 
second threshold (two additional plant species from the 
list) is passed, the payment is nearly doubled.  
 
An interesting question concerns the conditions under 
which making use of thresholds is preferable to using 
continuous performance measures. In their model, Arnaiz 
and Salas-Fumás (2008) find that if the distribution of the 
undistorted performance measure’s noise term has semi-
heavy tails a scheme with thresholds may become optimal. 
Compared to a normal distribution, a distribution with 
semi-heavy tails has relatively more noise in the perform-
ance measure at extreme values. Thus, thresholds set 
around the mode of the distribution could be used instead 
of continuous measures to avoid the noisy extreme values. 
Based on a different model Levin (2003) notes that con-
tracts that are difficult for a third party to enforce may rely 
upon threshold payments rather than continuous pay-
ments to maximize incentives. Table 4 summarizes the key 
characteristics of three schemes that make use of per-
formance thresholds. It is interesting to note that all three 
schemes provide for base payments. In the first case, the 
base payment is conditional on certain action-oriented 
criteria. In the Mongolian scheme (case 3) the base pay-
ment consists of a guaranteed purchase of defined 
amounts of handicrafts.  Zabel & Roe – Performance payments for environmental services 
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Table 4: Payment schemes with performance thresholds 
Program location (Source)  Goal(s) to be achieved  Incentives 
1  Germany (Ministerium 
Ländlicher Raum, 2000) 
Compensation for agricultural services in par-
ticular preservation and maintenance of the 
cultural landscape, environmental protection, 
and market relief.  
Secure existence of sufficient numbers of farms 
to preserve and maintain the cultural landscape 
Payment (max. approx. US$80 per ha and year) 
for at least four out of a given list of 28 plant 
species 
2  Switzerland (Schweize-
rischer Bundesrat, 2001) 
Preservation and advancement of biodiversity 
on farmland used as ecological buffer area with 
exceptional biological quality 
Payment (approx. US$500 per ha & year) for at 
least 6 out of given lists of plant species (differ-
ent plant lists for different regions) 
3  Mongolia  
(Mishra et al., 2003) 
Snow leopard (Uncia uncial) conservation  20% top up on price of handicrafts if no viola-
tions to the contracted program rules (ban on 
hunting snow leopards and their prey) 
 
4.5  When not to use performance 
payment schemes 
The sections above discussed various types of incentive 
payment schemes and conditions under which they may 
be recommendable policy options. There are however 
certain general conditions under which implementing an 
incentive payment scheme is not advisable. Most obviously 
this is the case if a clear-cut goal statement is lacking. Also, 
an incentive payment scheme should not be set up if no 
adequate performance indicators with reasonable levels 
of risk and distortion can be identified. 
 
Provided suitable performance indicators are available, a 
method to link the performance value to the scheme par-
ticipant who is responsible for the outcome is necessary. In 
some cases the link may be obvious, e.g. if a performance 
indicator such as number of trees is directly measured on 
someone’s land. In developing countries where property 
rights are often lacking, even immobile indicators such as 
trees may be difficult to assign to individuals. Mobile indi-
cators such as wildlife or water are likely to be confronted 
with difficulties in allocation. A solution is to collectively 
reward groups of people or communities instead of indi-
viduals. However, this approach requires collective action 
among the beneficiaries (Rojahn and Engel, 2005; Zabel 
and Holm-Müller, 2008). In cases where success of collec-
tive action is doubtful, alternatives to performance pay-
ments may be more promising. 
 
The installation of a performance payment scheme within 
a defined geographical area may induce people to migrate 
to this region to benefit from the scheme. Especially in 
developing countries, if the stakes are high enough, such a 
welfare magnet effect could cause perverse effects for 
environmental conservation.  
 
A further issue that needs to be considered is whether the 
expenses of monitoring and managing a performance 
payment scheme can be met. Next to the actual payments 
issued to scheme participants these transaction costs are 
likely to be substantial. Provision of long-term financing is 
often mentioned to be a crucial determinant of success, in 
particular if major investments are required (Meinzen-Dick 
et al., 2002; Pagiola et al., 2007). Unlike eco-tourism or 
eco-labeling performance payments are not self-
sustained. They rather need a continuous source of fund-
ing. 
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5 Discussion 
Performance payments are a relatively new environmental 
policy instrument with rather few well-established 
schemes. With respect to creating incentives for the pro-
duction of a defined environmental goal, the advantages 
of performance payments as opposed to more indirect 
conventional approaches, such as area-based payments, 
eco-labeling, or eco-tourism, may seem enticing (Ferraro 
2001; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson 2002; 
Engel et al. 2008). In particular, their conditionality concept 
and direct incentives seem promising. Maximum flexibility 
and room for innovations is provided to scheme partici-
pants with respect to methods to achieve the desired 
environmental outcome. If not controlled for, the flexibility 
of production processes may, however, also induce distor-
tion due to moral hazard. 
 
Before starting to design an agri-environmental or PES 
scheme, policy makers must make clear-cut decisions on 
exactly what their goal is, e.g. whether the sole goal is to 
procure a defined environmental outcome or whether the 
goal rather is to use agri-environmental schemes as policy 
tool to provide income support to a large number of farm-
ing households. In the former case, performance pay-
ments may be an interesting option whereas in the second 
case other policy options may be more suitable (Claassen 
et al., 2001). Although WTO green-box compatible, per-
formance payments are not likely to be a good policy 
choice for general income support.  
 
The two major questions raised in this paper are how to 
optimally adjust incentives in a performance payment 
scheme in the presence of (i) risk, i.e. external environ-
mental noise, in the production process and (ii) distortion 
in the performance indicators. By reviewing findings pre-
sented in the accounting and contract theory literature 
solution strategies could be identified. In particular these 
are: when using only one indicator, the incentive payment 
should decrease as external noise, as well as the scheme 
participant’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion increase. 
Relative performance evaluation is a viable approach to 
back-out risk. Two important preconditions for relative 
performance evaluation are that (i) an individual cannot 
influence his benchmark and (ii) all participants’ perform-
ance is subject to a highly correlated source of external 
environmental noise. Finally, issuing threshold payments 
instead of continuous payments is a strategy to cope with 
noise which is not normally distributed but rather has 
semi-heavy tails.  
 
Concerning distorted indicators, the literature supports the 
intuition that the incentive payment should decrease as 
distortion increases. In some cases two indicators may be 
used which contain a trade-off between risk and distortion. 
An interesting finding is that it is optimal to increase the 
relative weight of the distorted but less risky indicator as 
the noise in the less distorted indicator increases. 
 
Currently much research is being done on different indica-
tor development approaches. Apart from risk and distor-
tion some general criteria for indicators are that they 
should be quantifiable, transparent, and easily understood 
by practitioners. (See Casey and Boody (2007) for an over-
view of recent approaches to measure environmental 
performance at the national and regional scale as well as 
at the farm level.) 
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The indicator selection process should always be accom-
panied by an assessment of the local scheme participants’ 
decision making processes. Such an assessment should 
take into account all relevant socio-economic and cultural 
factors that may guide scheme participant’s decision mak-
ing. The proposed assessment may aid to anticipate how 
the participants are likely to respond to incentive payments 
and to omit the creation of unintentional adverse incen-
tives. Since the response to an incentive may substantially 
vary, e.g. between people of different cultural groups, it 
would be unsound to suggest any universally optimal per-
formance indicators. For example, in some countries pro-
viding bounties as incentive to harvest invasive species is 
well-accepted, whereas in others eradication efforts have 
been stopped by animal rights activists (Bremner and Park, 
2007). 
 
Performance payment schemes require a number of con-
ditions to be met, but under given circumstances they have 
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